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few years has not contributed to a sustained increase in the living stan-
d a rds of many U.S. workers. In late September the Census Bure a u
re p o rted that the number of Americans living in poverty in 1997 was
35.6 million (a figure unchanged from 1996) and that real median
household income has only recently re t u rned to its 1989 level of
$37,005. That so many Americans face such poor or mediocre economic
circumstances following the longest uninterrupted economic expansion
of the postwar period is unconscionable, and serious inquiry into why
the fruits of growth are so unevenly distributed is required. The need for
analysis and corrective action becomes even more urgent in the face of
the real possibility of an oncoming recession, a situation that would
quickly wipe out whatever gains workers at the bottom of the income
distribution have achieved.
One explanation off e red for such small or nonexistent gains is that
many of the jobs that have been generated do not pay well. In this
Public Policy Brief, Research Assistant Marc-André Pigeon and Senior
Scholar L. Randall Wray explain that although low-wage jobs have
played a role in dampening income growth at the bottom of the wage
scale, other factors may be more important. The authors make a forceful
argument that the fall in the unemployment rate masks the real prob-
lem: Less-educated Americans are being excluded from the labor force.
The argument developed by Pigeon and Wray is based on an analysis of
population and employment data for people aged 25 and older fro m
1992 to the first half of 1998. During this period the population grew by
11.4 million and employment rose by 11.6 million, while unemployment
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fell by 2.7 million and the number of individuals out of the labor force
increased by 2.5 million. These aggregate figures are consistent with the
picture of a tight labor market. However, once the data are disaggregated
by level of education (generally considered a proxy for skill levels), a
strikingly diff e rent picture emerges. The authors estimate that of the
11.6 million new jobs created, only about 700,000 (a meager 6 percent)
were awarded to workers who have no college education, even though
about 50 percent of the U.S. population fall into this group. Most star-
tling, however, is the authors’ estimate of 26 million potentially employ-
able Americans, which they define as people who are off i c i a l l y
unemployed plus those who are currently out of the labor force but
might reenter under certain conditions. This figure, which is over six
times the current number of officially unemployed, re p resents a huge
waste of human potential, especially in the face of such a vital economy.
In response to these problems, the authors advocate a job opport u n i t y
program similar in spirit to a proposal made several years ago by Hyman
P. Minsky. Pigeon and Wray argue that the federal government can and
must ensure a job for every individual who demonstrates that he or she is
ready, willing and able to work. The workers in such a program would
p rovide a buffer pool of labor from which business could draw during
u p t u rns instead of bidding up wages of college-educated workers. Price
stability and full employment could thus exist as complements.
While the advantages and disadvantages of such a problem are open to
discussion, I believe that Pigeon and Wray’s analysis points to important
issues often neglected in discussions of the labor market. I hope you find
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As the long, relatively robust Clinton-era expansion comes to its appare n t
end, it is time to take stock of the impact it has had on labor market oppor-
tunities. The official unemployment rate has fallen to 4.5 percent, the low-
est level in three decades. President Clinton is rightly proud of the number
of jobs created during this expansion. The long-term downward trend of
real wages that began in the early 1970s was stopped. Real wages have
i n c reased 4.2 percent since 1994, the longest period of sustained incre a s e s
since the late 1960s and early 1970s. From June 1997 to June 1998, average
nominal hourly earnings rose by 4.1 percent, or by 2.4 percentage points
m o re than the rate of increase of the consumer price index (up only 1.7
p e rcent over the same period). Furt h e r, demand for experienced and skilled
workers has been so high that average weekly hours worked has climbed
d r a m a t i c a l l y. Many commentators have remarked on the tightness of the
labor market. Employers from various regions have re p o rted difficulty in
filling job vacancies and Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan has
issued warnings that the extremely low inflation rates experienced in re c e n t
years may not continue because the labor market tightness will place pre s-
s u re on wages, and thus on costs and prices (Greenspan 1998).
The question we ask here, however, is whether employment gains have
been shared across the labor force. More specifically, does a rising economic
tide lift the boats of those with lower skill levels or will specific policies be
re q u i red to provide employment opportunities to the less skilled? We find
that over the entire Clinton expansion only 700,000 of the almost 12 mil-
lion new jobs created went to the half of the population that has not
attended college. The putatively tight labor market has not succeeded in
luring workers with no college education into the labor force. Thus, even at
the peak of the expansion, there is still an intolerably high level of wasted
Did the Clinton Rising Tide 
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human re s o u rces. We conclude that well-targeted, active labor market poli-
cies will be re q u i red for those left behind by the Clinton rising tide.
Overall Labor Market Conditions
S u p e rf i c i a l l y, it would appear that the Clinton tide has indeed lifted all
boats. Not only are the aggregate employment statistics overw h e l m i n g l y
positive, but the data also suggest that employment gains are widespre a d
a c ross sex, race, and age categories. For example, Bureau of Labor
Statistics data in Table 1 show that the unemployment rate in the first half
of 1998 for males aged 20 and over is the lowest since the early 1970s. For
females aged 20 and over the 1998 unemployment rate is the best since
the late 1960s. Even teens (16 to 19 years old), traditionally beset by
unemployment considerably higher than other population segments, are
finding a more receptive job market. The teen unemployment rate is at an
almost 30-year low despite the fact that, as we shall soon see, college edu-
cation is more important today than it was 30 years ago for obtaining and
keeping a job.
Table 1 also shows that job growth has spread to traditionally disadvan-
taged racial groups. Blacks and Hispanics enjoy the lowest unemployment
rates since the data were first disaggregated by race in the early 1970s. To be
s u re, both racial groups continue to endure unemployment rates much
higher than their white counterparts, indicating that there remains consid-
erable room for pro g ress. For example, in the first half of 1998 blacks aged
16 and over had an unemployment rate of 9.05 percent compared with
3.88 percent for whites. Employment-to-population ratios (here a f t e r
re f e rred to as employment rates) are more ambiguous but still suggest simi-
lar trends. The overall employment rate for workers aged 16 and over has
g rown steadily throughout the 1990s and is at a re c o rd high of 64.1 perc e n t .
The current expansion has also led to improvements in the employment
rates for Hispanics, black teens, and black females.
The overall picture then is one of falling unemployment rates and rising
employment rates in the mid 1990s. This seems to be consistent with the
view that labor markets are tight. However, closer analysis indicates that
this is true only for the half of the population that has attended college. 
PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:54 PM  Page 8PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:54 PM  Page 9Did the Clinton Rising Tide Raise All Boats?
Public Policy Brief 10
Labor Market Conditions for Low-Skilled Wo r k e r s
One might expect that as an expansion continues and as labor market con-
ditions become tight, employers would reach further down the skills con-
tinuum. Perhaps an employer would prefer to hire a college graduate, but if
the market has become so tight that college graduates must be bid away
f rom other firms, the employer might have to settle for an employee who
has not earned a college degree and invest in additional training to bring
the employee’s skills up to the desired level. An employer who would have
been happy to hire someone with a couple of years of college education
might have to settle for a high school graduate. And so on down to the
employer who must reach into the pool of high school dro p o u t s .
We would expect that as labor markets tighten, unemployment rates would
fall first for workers of higher skill levels and then for workers with less skill
and education. Employers would then seek employees from among those
who were out of the labor force, trying to entice them with appealing labor
market opportunities and higher wages. We would thus see rising employ-
ment rates, first for the higher skilled and then for the lower skilled.
E v e n t u a l l y, if labor markets became sufficiently tight, the labor force part i c-
ipation rates for all skill levels should converge toward some maximum fea-
sible rate.
Figure 1 Employment Rates, Population 25 and Over, by
Education, 1992 to 1998
Note: Data for 1998 are for the first six months of the year.
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On the surface, this appears to be happening. For example, Joseph Ritter
states that “lower-skill groups have increased their employment rates signif-
icantly; since 1994 the ratio for those who did not finish high school has
risen by about 3 percentage points” (Ritter 1998, 1). Indeed, Ritter re p o rt s
that all of the growth of the overall employment rate can be attributed to
those who have not obtained a college degree, with the greatest gains at
the lowest levels of educational attainment. As Figure 1 shows, the
employment rate for those with a college degree or better has remained vir-
tually constant throughout the expansion at just under 79 percent; the rate
for those with some college (those who either did not graduate from col-
lege or earned an associate’s degree) has risen 1.3 percentage points to 72.3
p e rcent; and the rate for high school graduates has risen 1.1 perc e n t a g e
points to 62.7 percent. In contrast, the employment rate for high school
d ropouts has risen more than 3 percentage points to 39.6 perc e n t .1
Ritter notes that although “unemployment rates produce a less dramatic
p i c t u re” (1998, 1), they, too, provide supporting evidence for the view that
a rising tide has lifted all boats. As Figure 2 shows, between 1992 and 1998
the unemployment rate fell from 3.2 percent to 1.8 percent for college
graduates, from 5.7 percent to 3.1 percent for workers with some college,
and from 6.8 percent to 4.7 percent for high school graduates. As with
employment rates, the largest gain was experienced at the bottom of the
educational ladder: the unemployment rate fell 4.4 percentage points to 7.1
p e rcent for high school dro p o u t s .
Figure 2 Unemployment Rates, Population 25 and Over, by
Education, 1992 to 1998
Year
Note: Data for 1998 are for the first six months of the year.
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P re s e n t l y, 17 percent of the population 25 and over have not finished high
school, 33 percent are high school graduates but did not attend college, 25
p e rcent have some college education or an associate’s degree, and another
25 percent have a college degree (see Figure 3). Thus, the U.S. population
is just about evenly divided between those who have at least some college
and those who have none. Analysts believe that educational attainment is
a good proxy for skill level, so the data for employment and unemployment
rates seem to support the belief that the current expansion has incre a s e d
job opportunities, with the greatest gains accruing to those with the lowest
skill level—and especially for high school dropouts. One could conclude
that if the expansion continues, job opportunities would “trickle down” so
that eventually both the unemployment rate and the employment rate of
high school dropouts might approach those for college graduates.
T h e re are several reasons to question such a rosy scenario. First, the gaps
between those who attended college and high school dropouts are huge,
especially for employment rates. Well over half of noninstitutionalized high
school dropouts remain out of the labor force, compared with only a quart e r
of those who attended college. If the current expansion raises the employ-
ment rate for high school dropouts by only about 3 percentage points over a
p e r i od of 6 years, by simple extrapolation, the expansion would have to
continue for another 78 years before the gap could be closed. 
Figure 3  Population, 25 and Over, by Education, 1998
Note: Data for 1998 are for the first six months of the year.
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Second, one would expect the trend to be reversed as soon as the economy
slows, with the “last hired” low-skilled workers being the “first fired.” Many
analysts, including David A. Levy and Wynne Godley of the Levy Institute,
believe that the expansion will soon end and that the likelihood of a deep
and prolonged recession is high. This means the gaps could become wider
than they were in 1992, before the expansion.
F i n a l l y, and more import a n t l y, careful analysis of employment and popula-
tion data casts doubt even on the conclusion that employment opport u n i-
ties increased significantly for the less skilled during the robust Clinton
expansion. While it is true that unemployment rates fell and that employ-
ment rates rose, it is less than clear that these data indicate substantially
m o re favorable labor market conditions for the lower half of the skills lad-
d e r. Indeed, the apparent improvement may have had more to do with
reduction of the population of those who have not attended college. For
example, the high school dropout population fell by 2.8 million, or 9 per-
cent, and the number out of the labor force fell by nearly 2 million (see
Table 2). Furt h e r, as we will show, almost all the job gains went to the pop-
ulation with at least some college education.
F i g u res 4 and 5 present the data in diagrammatic form to clarify the situa-
tion. The top part of Figure 4 shows that the U.S. population grew by 11.4
million between 1992 and 1998, employment rose by 11.6 million, unem-
ployment fell by 2.7 million, and the number of individuals out of the labor
f o rce rose by 2.5 million. The situation, then, is consistent with the view
that we currently have a tight labor market because employment gre w
faster than population. However, the bottom part of Figure 4 shows that
v i rtually all of the population growth consisted of additions of individuals
who had some college or had graduated college—two groups that alre a d y
had high employment rates. The number of high school dropouts fell by 2.8
million, with the largest decline in the number of high school dro p o u t s
who were out of the labor forc e .2 Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, there was
no net gain in the number of high school dropouts employed over the
whole expansion. This means that all of the rise of the employment rate for
that group (re p o rted above and by Ritter) was due to a shrinking popula-
tion and none to rising employment. High school graduates gained just
under 800,000 jobs, while 10.8 million of the 11.6 million new jobs went to
those who had at least some college education. Although it is true that the
number of unemployed fell by 745,000 for high school dropouts and by 1.1
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Table 2 Population and Labor Force, 25 and Over, by Education, 1992 to 1998
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  C h a n g e
Population (in thousands)
High school dro p o u t 3 2 , 4 5 7 3 1 , 2 1 6 3 0 , 6 7 6 3 0 , 0 9 2 3 0 , 1 6 6 2 9 , 7 5 7 2 9 , 6 7 7 – 2 , 7 8 0
High school graduate 5 7 , 1 0 6 5 7 , 5 6 2 5 6 , 6 4 3 5 6 , 1 4 7 5 6 , 4 1 7 5 7 , 4 2 4 5 7 , 5 9 1 4 8 5
Some college 3 6 , 0 1 3 3 7 , 7 7 6 3 9 , 9 4 8 4 1 , 4 6 3 4 1 , 6 8 8 4 1 , 9 4 6 4 2 , 1 2 8 6 , 1 1 5
College graduate 3 4 , 6 3 1 3 5 , 7 0 7 3 6 , 9 9 9 3 8 , 5 0 7 3 9 , 9 7 6 4 1 , 2 0 0 4 2 , 1 7 5 7 , 5 4 4
To t a l 1 6 0 , 2 0 6 1 6 2 , 2 6 1 1 6 4 , 2 6 6 1 6 6 , 2 0 9 1 6 8 , 2 4 7 1 7 0 , 3 2 7 1 7 1 , 5 7 0 1 1 , 3 6 4
Employment (in thousands)
High school dro p o u t 1 1 , 8 4 7 1 1 , 2 0 3 1 1 , 0 5 6 1 0 , 9 4 4 1 1 , 3 2 1 1 1 , 5 4 9 1 1 , 7 5 2 – 9 5
High school graduate 3 5 , 3 0 8 3 5 , 4 0 1 3 5 , 1 4 1 3 5 , 0 0 2 3 5 , 2 9 4 3 6 , 1 7 7 3 6 , 0 9 2 7 8 4
Some college 2 5 , 5 8 0 2 6 , 8 9 6 2 8 , 6 9 5 2 9 , 6 7 9 2 9 , 9 9 1 3 0 , 3 1 9 3 0 , 4 7 1 4 , 8 9 1
College graduate 2 7 , 2 7 2 2 8 , 1 1 2 2 9 , 2 5 5 3 0 , 4 1 3 3 1 , 4 5 7 3 2 , 4 8 6 3 3 , 2 8 4 6 , 0 1 2
To t a l 1 0 0 , 0 0 7 1 0 1 , 6 1 3 1 0 4 , 1 4 7 1 0 6 , 0 3 9 1 0 8 , 0 6 4 1 1 0 , 5 3 0 1 1 1 , 5 9 9 1 1 , 5 9 2
Unemployment (in thousands)
High school dro p o u t 1,636  1,359  1,197  1,079  1,077  1,015  891  – 7 4 5
High school graduate 2,589  2,364  2,982  1,746  1,724  1,605  1,487  – 1 , 1 0 2
Some college 1,528  1,483  1,335  1,228  1,164  1,020  956  – 5 7 2
College graduate 8 9 5 8 5 4 773  7 6 3 7 2 4 666  6 0 8 – 2 8 7
To t a l 6,648  6,060  6,287  4,816  4,689  4,306  3,942  – 2 , 7 0 6
Out of labor force (in thousands)
High school dro p o u t 18,974  18,654  18,423  18,069  17,768  17,193  17,034  – 1 , 9 4 0
High school graduate 19,208  19,797  18,520  19,399  19,398  19,642  20,012  8 0 3
Some college 8,905  9,396  9,918  10,556  10,534  10,608  10,701  1 , 7 9 6
College graduate 6,464  6,741  6,971  7,331  7,795  8,048  8 , 2 8 2 1 , 8 1 8
To t a l 53,551  54,588  53,832  55,354  55,495  5 5 , 4 9 0 56,029  2 , 4 7 7
Unemployment rate (perc e n t )
High school dro p o u t 11.50  10.80  9.80  9.00  8.70  8.10  7.10  – 4 . 4 0
High school graduate 6.80  6.30  5.30  4.80  4.70  4.20  4.70  –2.10 
Some college 5.70  5.20  4.50  4.00  3.80  3.20  3.10  –2.60 
College graduate 3.20  3.00  2.60  2.50  2.20  2.00  1 . 8 0 –1.40 
Weighted average 6.20  5.60  5.70  4.30  4.20  3.80  3.40  –2.80 
Employment rate (perc e n t )
High school dro p o u t 36.50  35.89  36.04  36.37  37.53  38.81  39.60  3 . 1 0
High school graduate 61.83  61.50  62.04  62.34  62.56  63.00  62.67  0 . 8 4
Some college 71.03  71.20  71.83  71.58  71.94  72.28  72.33  1 . 3 0
College graduate 78.75  78.73  79.07  78.98  78.69  78.85  78.92  0 . 1 7
Weighted average 62.42  62.62  63.40  63.79  64.22  64.89  65.05  2 . 6 3
Note: Change is calculated as the 1998 value minus the 1992 value. Data for 1998 are for the first six months of the year.
S o u rc e :B u reau of Labor Statistics Internet site: www. s t a t s . b l s . g o v : 8 0 .
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million for high school graduates, the overall employment picture is not
one of substantial improvement for those with low skills. One could arg u e ,
based on the increase in their employment rate, that the situation of those
who did not attend college (high school dropouts and graduates) impro v e d .
H o w e v e r, over the entire Clinton expansion, only about 6 percent of the
new jobs (roughly 700,000 jobs) were created for the half of the population
that has not attended college. Thus, we believe the data at least part i a l l y
contradict the story that says a tight labor market is forcing firms to re a c h
down to hire the less skilled.
F i g u re 5 examines the employment picture in more detail. We calculated
how much of the increase of employment came from a reduction in the
number of unemployed, how much from a reduction in workers who are out
of the labor force, and how much from population growth. Of the 11.6 mil-
lion net employment increase, 2.7 million can be attributed to a re d u c t i o n
of unemployment, with 1.8 million attributed to a reduction of unemploy-
ment among those who did not attend college (1.1 million high school
graduates and 745,000 high school dropouts) and just under 1 million to a
reduction of unemployment of those with at least some college (287,000
college graduates and 572,000 with some college). The remaining incre a s e
of 8.9 million in employment can be attributed to net entrants into the
labor force, due to rising population and to rising labor force part i c i p a t i o n
rates. Somewhat surprisingly, high school dropouts and high school gradu-
ates account for a net loss here; reduction of unemployment (by 1.8 mil-
lion) for these groups is more than the total increase of employment for
these two groups (689,000)—by an amount equal to more than a million.
In other words, all of the employment gain that can be attributed to net
entrants came from jobs given to workers who attended college. Net
entrants with at least some college amounted to 10.1 million and re d u c t i o n
of unemployment for this group filled another 859,000 jobs. This means
that 10.9 million new jobs were filled by that half of the population with at
least some college education, leaving less than 700,000 new jobs to be
s h a red by the half of the population that did not attend college.
When we further analyze the net entrants to separate re-entrants from new
entrants, we estimate that all the employment growth can be attributed to
new entrants. Here we have used proxies because it is impossible to identify
re-entrants and new entrants using aggregate time series data. We took pop-
ulation growth (or decline) for each educational group and multiplied it by
PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:54 PM  Page 15PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:55 PM  Page 16Job Opportunity for the Less Skilled
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
the gro u p ’s 1992 employment rate to obtain an estimate of how many of
the net additions to (subtractions from) that gro u p ’s population should
have been expected to find jobs (lose jobs). Again, the college-educated
account for more than the total net employment gain by new entrants—
sheer growth of the numbers of college educated should have been suff i-
cient to fill over 10 million new jobs. In other words, job creation during
the Clinton expansion was marginally greater than what was re q u i red to
p rovide jobs for college-educated new entrants; the “extra” jobs were filled
by reducing the ranks of the unemployed. Job creation was not sufficient to
draw workers from out of the labor force; indeed, in an important sense,
t h e re was net job opportunity loss for the low-skilled, out-of-the-labor- f o rc e
Figure 5 Changes in Employment, Population 25 and Over, by Education,
1992 to 1998 (in millions)
Note: “New entrants” are calculated by multiplying the change in population (1992 to 1998)
by the 1992 employment rate; “re-entrants” are calculated as net entrants less calculated new
entrants. Numbers may not add up to the third digit because of rounding. Data for 1998 are 
for the first six months of the year. 
S o u rc e : B u reau of Labor Statistics Internet site: www. s t a t s . b l s . g o v : 8 0 .
Employment 
+ 1 1 . 5 9
High school dropout  –0 . 0 9 5
High school graduate + 0 . 7 8 4
Some college + 4 . 8 9 1
College graduate  + 6 . 0 1 2
Unemployment 
– 2 . 7 1
High school dropout  –0 . 7 4 5
High school graduate – 1 . 1 0 2
Some college – 0 . 5 7 2
College graduate  – 0 . 2 8 7
Net Entrants into Labor Force  
+ 8 . 8 8
High school dropout  –0 . 8 4 0
High school graduate – 0 . 3 1 8
Some college + 4 . 3 1 9
College graduate  + 5 . 7 2 5
Re-entrants 
– 0 . 6 6 7
High school dropout  + 0 . 1 8 0
High school graduate –0 . 6 1 7
Some college –0 . 0 2 0
College graduate  –0 . 2 1 0
New Entrants 
+ 9 . 5 6
High school dropout  – 1 . 0 2 0
High school graduate + 0 . 2 9 9
Some college + 4 . 3 4 0
College graduate  + 5 . 9 4 0
PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:55 PM  Page 17individuals. This can be attributed either to relatively rapid growth of the
college-educated population or to the relatively low pace of net job 
c reation, as one prefers. The overall picture is certainly not one of tre m e n-
dous employment gains for the bottom half of the skills ladder.
Our analysis, then, raises questions about the degree of labor market tight-
ness. Although it may be true that labor bottlenecks exist, the overall pic-
t u re is not one of significant pre s s u re on labor markets—job creation just
kept pace with the increase of the number of college-educated workers.
This view is consistent with a recent analysis by Bluestone and Rose
(1998), who call into question the usefulness of the unemployment rate as
a measure of labor market slack because it fails to reflect accurately hours
worked by people who already have jobs. This shortcoming, they arg u e ,
goes a long way toward explaining why the actual unemployment rate has
b e t t e red most conventional measures of the nonaccelerating-inflation rate
of unemployment (NAIRU) without sparking inflation. The authors show
how hours worked have been steadily climbing since the early 1980s,
re t u rning to a level not seen since the late 1960s and leading to a de facto
labor supply increase that has kept a lid on wages. They argue that the steep
decline in the unemployment rate over the last five years occurred along-
side increased job insecurity and more or less stagnant hourly wages, which
have made workers willing to work longer hours at prevailing wages.
Longer working hours have increased the elasticity of labor supply so that
output can rise at a fast clip without inducing inflation by producing bottle-
necks for workers with particular skills—since the already employed work-
ers can be induced to put in extra hours.
As Bluestone and Rose show, the picture for high school dropouts appears
worse still when one looks at hours worked data. College workers have, on
average, the longest workweek, followed by high school graduates, workers
with some college, and, finally, high school dropouts. In 1995, for example,
the average college worker put in 41.6 hours, 18 percent more than high
school dropouts, who averaged only 35.2 hours, and the gap has been
steadily widening. Whereas employees in the college graduate, some col-
lege, and high school graduate categories have all increased hours worked
since the 1970s, high school dropouts have seen a systematic decline.
Thus, not only are high school dropouts stymied by an unreceptive job
market, but they are also missing out on one of the few ways that workers
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have been able to increase real income in recent years, and that is by work-
ing additional hours. 
This re i n f o rces the notion that there remains considerable slack for those
in the lowest educational category. Not only is the employment rate much
lower for high school dropouts than for other educational categories, but
these workers also have much unused capacity in terms of hours worked.
Recent wage data give added weight to this argument. Wages and benefits
for blue-collar workers rose 2.7 percent for the year ended June 1998, com-
p a red with a 4 percent increase for white-collar workers and a 3.9 perc e n t
i n c rease for service-sector workers.
The Potentially Employable 
As we noted above, unemployment rates for the less educated are signifi-
cantly higher than for those with at least some college. For example, high
school dropouts currently have an unemployment rate greater than 7 per-
cent, while the rate is 1.8 percent for college graduates and 3.4 percent for
the 25 and over labor force as a whole. However, much more import a n t l y,
the employment rate is strikingly lower for those with the lowest educa-
tional attainment; an astounding 57 percent of the noninstitutionalized, 25
and over, high school dropout population is currently out of the labor forc e ,
c o m p a red with just under 20 percent of college graduates in the same age
g roup. Even after the long and robust expansion of the 1990s, over 56 mil-
lion noninstitutionalized, 25 and over adults remain out of the labor
f o rce—many times greater than the 3.9 million who are officially unem-
ployed. Admittedly, many of the 56 million do not wish to participate in
the labor force; some are willing to participate only on some conditions,
and almost 27.7 million are 65 and over. However, it is useful to try to esti-
mate how many of those currently out of the labor force might be a poten-
tial source of labor supply.
Economists have long understood that flows among official categories are
l a rge: about half of those individuals who lose jobs become officially classi-
fied as out of the labor force rather than as unemployed (Marshall, Briggs,
and King 1984, 364). Furt h e r, many of those who obtain jobs come fro m
out of the labor force rather than from the unemployed, and there are 
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of the unemployed. Some empirical re s e a rch has even shown that for cer-
tain population segments there may be no substantive diff e rence between
being unemployed and out of the labor force (Summers and Clark 1979;
Tano 1991; Gonul 1992; and Jones and Riddell, forthcoming). For this re a-
son, one cannot rely solely on data for the officially unemployed to obtain
estimates of how many individuals would accept jobs if they became avail-
able. Furt h e r, job availability alone does not determine whether an individ-
ual will come into the labor force. Individuals may be out of the labor forc e
for a number of reasons: prospective wages may be too low (for example, for
those with low skills); family responsibilities may be too great (for example,
a person might have to remain home to care for children or sick re l a t i v e s ) ;
cultural norms and expectations may raise barriers (for example, labor forc e
p a rticipation by women is frowned upon among some groups); poor health
(mental and physical) or personal characteristics (gang membership, crimi-
nal re c o rd) may diminish individuals’ desire to work and their desirability
f rom the perspective of potential employers. 
A recent study by former Bureau of Labor Statistics economist Monica
Castillo (1998) provides evidence that individuals classified as nonpart i c i-
pants are not always unwilling or unable to work. Castillo found that 10
p e rcent (or 6.2 million) of those classified as out of the labor force in 1994
said they wanted a job. Blacks and young people made up a large portion of
these people. By 1995, 41 percent of nonparticipants who had said they
wanted a job in the 1994 survey were in the labor force. In other words, of
the 6.2 million who had been out of the labor force but said they wanted to
work, more than 2.5 million came into the labor force during the next year.
C a s t i l l o ’s study also indicates that prior work experience as well as curre n t
p a rticipation in the labor force are important factors in determining future
e m p l o y a b i l i t y. For example, only one-third of those who in 1994 were clas-
sified as nonparticipants and said they wanted a job were able to find work
in 1995, compared with a 53 percent success rate (in finding a job) for
those who in 1994 were classified as unemployed. These data suggest there
is a significant pool of potential workers outside the measured labor forc e .
H o w e v e r, most of them find it difficult to get a job even when they come
into the labor force to search for work.
It is highly likely that characteristics that reduce the likelihood that one is
in the labor force are negatively correlated with educational attainment.
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not be attributed to lack of job availability alone. Many of these individuals
have characteristics that make them less likely to be employed in addition
to having low education and skills. However, we believe it is still wort h-
while to obtain what might be thought of as an upper-bound estimate of
the number of potentially employable, which would include not only those
who are actively seeking work (now counted as unemployed), but also
those who are currently out of the labor force but who might be employed if
some conditions were met. 
We will assume that the labor force participation rate for college gradu-
ates, 25 and over, in the middle of 1998 (80.4 percent) re p resents a fea-
sible maximum on the grounds that given tight labor markets for the
highly skilled, all college graduates who want to work are now working
or actively seeking work, with only some frictional unemployment and
with virtually no one involuntarily out of the labor force. Using the par-
ticipation rate of the college graduates to find the target number of
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Table 3 Potentially Employable Workers, 25 and Over, by Education (in thousands)
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  Change
Actual employment
High school dropout 11,847  11,203  11,056  10,944  11,321  11,549  11,752  –95 
High school graduate 35,308  35,401  35,141  35,002  35,294  36,177  36,092  784 
Some college 25,580  26,896  28,695  29,679  29,991  30,319  30,471  4,891 
College graduate 27,272  28,112  29,255  30,413  31,457  32,486  33,284  6,012 
Total 100,007  101,613  104,147  106,039  108,064  110,530  111,599  11,592 
Target employment (80.4%)
High school dropout 26,095  25,098  24,664  24,194  24,254  23,925  23,860  –2,235
High school graduate 45,913  46,280  45,541  45,142  45,359  46,169  46,303  390 
Some college 28,954  30,372  32,118  33,336  33,517  33,725  33,871  4,916 
College graduate 27,843  28,708  29,747  30,960  32,141  33,124  33,908  6,065
Total 128,806 130,458 132,070 133,632 135,271 136,943 137,942 9,136 
Potentially employable
High school dropout 14,248  13,894  13,608  13,250  12,932  12,376  12,108  –2,140
High school graduate 10,605  10,879  10,400  10,140  10,065  9,992  10,211  –394
Some college 3,374  3,475  3,424  3,657  3,527  3,406  3,400  25 
College graduate 571  596  492  547  684  639  624  53 
Total 28,799  28,845  27,923  27,593  27,207  26,412  26,343  –2,456
Note: “Change” is calculated as the 1998 value minus the 1992 value. “Potentially employable” is calculated as the
difference between target employment and actual employment. Data for 1998 are for the first six months of the year. 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Internet site: www.stats.bls.gov:80.
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many potentially employable individuals existed for each educational
c a t e g o ry by subtracting the number of employed from the target number
of employed (see Table 3). Our calculations show that as of mid 1998,
t h e re were 624,000 college graduates, 3.4 million individuals who had
some college, 10.2 million high school graduates, and 12.1 million high
school dropouts, for a total of 26.3 million potentially employable. This
means that if we could increase labor force participation rates of all edu-
cational groups up to the rate currently experienced by college gradu-
ates, 26.3 million more individuals would be in the labor forc e .
O b v i o u s l y, this number is much in excess of the number of off i c i a l l y
unemployed (which was less than 4 million for the 25 and over popula-
tion in mid 1998).
As shown in Table 3 and Figure 6, the current expansion has reduced the
number of potentially employable by about 2.5 million. Essentially, all of
the reduction can be attributed to a reduction of the number of unem-
ployed (a point we made above); in spite of the extent of the expansion,
t h e re has been no improvement with re g a rd to job opportunities for
those who are out of the labor force. The rising tide has done nothing to
reduce the waste of human potential that results from keeping out of the
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Figure 6 Potentially Employable Workers, 25 and Over, by
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26.3 million had been employed full time and had produced $5 worth of
GDP per hour employed, GDP would have been $263 billion higher.
We separated each educational category into two age groups—25 to 64
and 65 and over—to see if the inclusion of people 65 and over was
responsible for the startlingly high number of potentially employable
workers, especially among high school dropouts (see Figure 7).3 U s i n g
the 1998 (first half) participation rate for college graduates in the age
g roup 25 to 64, which is 88 percent, we then calculated how many
potentially employable individuals existed for each educational category
in the same way as before. The removal of the 65 and over population
has the effect of reducing the number of potentially employable workers
by about 11.4 million, with almost all of the decline accounted for by the
bottom half of the education ladder. 
M o re than half of the decline can be accounted for by high school dro p o u t s
alone. This is not surprising. First, we estimate that about two-thirds of the
65 and over population have a high school diploma or less versus about
half for the entire population. Second, and from the point of view of more
traditional labor market analysis, one would expect 65 and over people to
Job Opportunity for the Less Skilled
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
Figure 7 Potentially Employable Workers, by Age and Education,
1998 
Note: Total potentially employable by age group: 14.95 for 25–64; 11.4 for 65+.
Data for 1998 are for the first six months of the year.
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class seniors with pensions and hefty re t i rement funds, not to mention
g o v e rnment safety nets. Thus, we might not expect a large influx of work-
ers from the 65 and over population segment—especially those with a
college education.
On the other hand, given that lifetime earnings are significantly affected by
educational attainment, we expect that many of the nearly 10.6 million
elderly with no college experience that we counted as potentially employ-
able would, if given a chance, supplement their relatively low re t i re m e n t
income with wages if jobs were made available. Indeed, the vast majority of
the 65 and over population is classified as out of the labor force and the
tendency is particularly striking for high school dropouts. We estimate that
about 92 percent of high school dropouts aged 65 and over are out of the
labor force, compared with 79 percent for college graduates of the same age.
College-educated individuals 65 and over are either working or have pro b a-
bly chosen to stay out of the labor force. High school dropouts 65 and over
p robably do not have a choice.
That being said, the figure of 15 million potentially employable workers for
the 25 to 64 age group is a reasonable estimate of the number of 
people who could work and it might be supplemented by some number of
elderly workers who would choose to participate in labor markets if given a
chance. We also note that the unemployment rate for high school dro p o u t s
worsens when we exclude 65 and over individuals, rising to about 7.3 per-
cent from 7.0 percent because few of the 65 and over population are
counted as unemployed. Furt h e rm o re, no matter how one looks at it, there
is still a glaring disparity between the number of potentially employable
workers at the low end of the education scale and the number at the high
end. Cert a i n l y, most of the unemployment for college graduates can be
accounted for by frictional unemployment. The same cannot be said for
high school dropouts or high school graduates who are unemployed or
might be involuntarily out of the labor force. 
Of course, it would be wrong to suppose that the 26.3 million potentially
employable people over the age of 25, or the 15 million potentially employ-
able in the 25 to 64 age group, are producing nothing of value. Many are
caring for young children or the sick, many participate as volunteers in a
variety of useful activities, many provide household services that make it
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p robably participate in “underg round” activities—some of which may add
to our nation's quality of life while others probably reduce it. Also, given
our state of knowledge, it is impossible to predict accurately how many of
these individuals would voluntarily participate under reasonable conditions
(for example, if a job were off e red at a minimum wage with a package of
benefits that might include health care and child care). Our point here is
not to assert that it is vital to ensure that every one of these individuals par-
ticipates in the labor force, but to question the ability of a rising tide to
raise all boats.
One might object to our analysis on the basis of Occam’s razor: perhaps all
of those who are currently out of the labor force really are out of the labor
f o rce. We see reasons to believe that this is not the case. First, as mentioned
above, we know that flows among the official categories are large—a person
c u rrently counted as out of the labor force may well show up as employed or
unemployed in a later surv e y. As the study by Castillo demonstrated, many
of those currently out of the labor force do want to work and may well
enter the labor force over the course of a year. Second, anecdotal evidence
indicates that when a major employer announces new positions, long
queues of applicants result; employers complain about the quality of appli-
cants, but not about the lack of applicants.4
It is important not to lose sight of the essence of our argument. We believe
it is misleading to conduct a “static” analysis of labor market conditions;
what is re q u i red is a “dynamic” analysis. Although it may be true that many
of those with low educational attainment really do not want to or cannot
work, this does not mean that policy should turn a blind eye to the pro b-
lem. The relatively low employment rate of high school dropouts and even
of high school graduates after removal of the 65 and over population indi-
cates there is a serious social problem that apparently cannot be resolved by
a robust and long expansion alone.  Even if none of these individuals could
be drawn into the labor force now, we need to put into place policies that
would increase job opportunities for the next crop of young people who for
whatever reason do not attend college. It is highly probable that the longer
individuals remain outside the labor force, the less likely it becomes that
they will become employed, especially if they have low educational attain-
ment. Long bouts of unemployment also entail high personal and societal
costs. Various psychological studies have linked prolonged unemployment to
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1981), perception of diminished self-worth (Cohn 1978), and higher rates of
suicide, mental illness, and alcohol abuse (Mallinckrodt and Fretz 1988).
Other studies have shown that unemployment is highly correlated with
crime, gang membership, divorce, and loss of human capital.
Employment opportunities must be created to raise the labor force part i c i-
pation rates of the young who will not attend college. To repeat, half of the
U.S. population has not attended college and this ratio is not likely to
change any time soon. So, even if far less than our calculated 26.3 million
a re potentially employable tod a y, well-designed policies could reduce the
waste of human potential that undoubtedly exists and will continue to exist
when over 60 percent of high school dropouts (or 42 percent after re m o v-
ing the 65 and over population) and nearly 40 percent of high school grad-
uates (or 25 percent after removing the 65 and over population) are not
employed, even after a long and robust expansion.
A Rising Tide Is Not Enough
Our analysis harkens back to the old debate between Keynesians and
Institutionalists on the best way to increase job opportunities for disadvan-
taged groups. Is an expanding economy with macro policies to fine-tune
a g g regate demand sufficient, as the Keynesians argue, or are well-targ e t e d
m i c ro policies re q u i red, as the Institutionalists hold? During the 1960s and
1970s the Keynesian position came to dominate. While it is true that inter-
ventionist labor market programs were tried even during the Keynesian
1960s and reached a culmination in the early 1970s, they were gradually
scaled back, if not abandoned altogether, by the end of the 1970s. At the
same time, the stagflationary 1970s cast doubt on Keynesian aggre g a t e
demand fine-tuning, with most economists concluding that attempts to
lower unemployment rates through macro policies that kept aggre g a t e
demand high brought unacceptably high inflation rates. Thus, by the 1990s
both the Keynesians and the Institutionalists had fallen out of favor. 
The prevailing view now is that free markets will generate high growth and
low unemployment (or, at least, the “natural rate” of unemployment).
H o w e v e r, many analysts have already remarked on the curious nature of
the Reagan-era expansion, during which inequality increased significantly
Did the Clinton Rising Tide Raise All Boats?
Public Policy Brief 26
PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:55 PM  Page 26Job Opportunity for the Less Skilled
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 27
(Peterson 1994). We have shown here that while job markets superf i c i a l l y
appear to be tight, few job opportunities have “trickled down.” This com-
plements analyses by other authors that show the Clinton expansion has
not reduced inequality (Wo l ff 1998; Mishel and Bernstein 1995; Karo l y
1996). Our conclusion is that neither the Reagan rising tide nor the
Clinton rising tide has been sufficient to lift the boats at the bottom. It
appears that the Institutionalists were right after all. No matter whether
expansions are packaged as Keynesian–led, supply side–led, or fre e
market–led, they must be supplemented with active labor market policy if
job opportunities are to be increased for those at the bottom.
Policy should provide paths to labor force participation other than college
attendance. Even if an expansion could be maintained for decades, this
would not increase the employment rates of the bottom half of the popula-
tion to the rate enjoyed by college graduates. Although it is true that
expansions lower unemployment rates of all groups, high unemployment
rates are not the major problem for those with low educational attainment.
R a t h e r, their problem is one of low employment rates. Expansions appear to
p romote “hiring off the top,” that is, filling job vacancies with those who
have attended college while doing far less for those at the bottom. We
expect that inflation would be induced long before firms would “hire off the
bottom” at a pace sufficient to significantly enhance real job opport u n i t i e s
for high school dro p o u t s .
The United States has a long tradition of active labor market policies, rang-
ing from informal policies such as unrestricted immigration in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century to broad-based policies such as the
C o m p rehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), which was
enacted in 1973 (see Tables 4, 5, and 6). As Marshall, Briggs, and King
(1984) make clear, CETA re p resented the apex of  interventionist labor
market policies that took root in the post-World War II era, part i c u l a r l y
during the 1960s and 1970s. Prior to this Keynesian period, employment
policy was to a large extent an ad hoc method of coping with an immediate
p roblem, such as the influx of soldiers from the first and second World Wa r s
(Smith-Fess Act, 1920; Serv i c e m e n ’s Readjustment Act, 1944) or a tempo-
r a ry measure to cope with the Great Depression (Wa g n e r-Peyser Act,
1933). Economic policy was dominated by the view that unemployment
was at worst a short - t e rm phenomenon.5 Of course, there were some longer-
t e rm strategies, as shown in the tables, but they were concerned mainly
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Table 4 Pre-1960 Employment Policies
Morill Act, 1862 The act established land grant universities—
schools designed to meet “practical needs,” in fields
such as agriculture and engineering, that were not
met by private universities, which were concern e d
with classical and theological subjects.
U n restricted immigration, Immigration was (and to some extent continues to
pre-1924  be) a major source of skilled and unskilled workers.
Smith-Hughes Act, 1917 The training programs established under this act
w e re designed to provide workers with vocational
education over the course of their lifetime. Federal
involvement was limited to matching state funds.
The programs failed to adapt to the changing stru c-
t u re of the labor market, as did the similar pro g r a m s
set up under the Georg e - B a rden Act in the 1940s.
Smith-Fess Act, 1920 The act was initially intended to provide training
p rograms to help rehabilitate injured World War I
soldiers. It was later applied to injured or handi-
capped World War II and then Korean War soldiers
and eventually was extended to handicapped civil-
ians. The federal government matched state fund-
ing. Quality varied significantly from state to state.
The programs were not effective because of lack of
e x p e rtise and shortages of trained personnel.
Wa g n e r-Peyser Act, 1933 This federally funded and state-run depre s s i o n - e r a
policy measure was designed to place unemployed
workers in jobs.
National Apprenticeship  A p p renticeship programs emphasized learn i n g - b y -
Act (Fitzgerald Act), 1937 doing with a combination of classroom instru c t i o n
and on-the-job training. The act set minimal stan-
d a rds in programs overseen by federal or state gov-
e rnment.  The  apprenticeship  program  was
reworked in the late 1960s and 1970s to reflect the
new labor market.
G e o rg e - B a rden Act, 1946 As with the Smith-Hughes Act, the training pro-
grams set up by this act were designed to pro v i d e
workers with lifetime vocational education. Federal
involvement was limited to matching state funds.
The programs did not change with changes in the
labor market; by 1965 most of the participants were
in agriculture or homemaking classes.
S e rv i c e m e n ’s Readjustment The GI Bill enabled millions of ex-soldiers to obtain
Act (GI Bill), 1944 vocational and technical training, on-the-job train-
ing, and college and postgraduate education. Most
of these people would never have had such oppor-
tunities in the absence of these veterans’ benefits.
Source: Based on Marshall, Briggs, and King 1984; Mangum 1966; Gottschalk 1998.
PPB No.45  2/18/99  2:55 PM  Page 28Job Opportunity for the Less Skilled
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 29
with education (Morill Act, 1862) or apprenticeship programs (National
A p p renticeship Act, 1937). 
C E TA was a radically diff e rent beast. It re p resented an amalgamation of
t h ree important pieces of labor legislation from the 1960s and early 1970s.
The first was the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) 
of 1962, which provided for a range of services including classroom job
Table 5 Post-1960 Employment Policies
Manpower Development  The federal government provided funds for a
and Training Act (MDTA),  wide range of work-related services inclu-
1962 ding c l a s s room job training, adult basic 
education, English as a second language,
counseling, career assessment, job develop-
ment, and job placement. It also pro v i d e d
training stipends and some monies for
transportation and tools.
Economic Opportunity Act  The EOA sought to attack the roots of povert y
(EOA), 1964  t h rough a variety of programs including help
for preschool children with learning pro b-
lems, work experience for teenagers, job
training for welfare recipients, and job cre-
ation for older workers in rural areas. It set
up community-based agencies to sponsor
some programs and to work on issues such as
voter registration, day care, health serv i c e s ,
and transportation. 
Emergency Employment Act  As part of the federal govern m e n t ’s re s p o n s e
(EEA), 1971 to stubbornly rising unemployment rates, the
act provided funds to local governments to
h i re people in public sector jobs.
Public Service Employment  The PSE fell under the EEA, which in turn
P rogram (PSE), 1971 became part of CETA in 1973 (see Table 6).
Following the tradition of government make-
work programs in the 1930s, it was designed
primarily as a countercyclical stabilization
tool to fight unemployment and hence as an
a l t e rnative to tax cuts. By the mid 1970s, it
was also seen as a means of addressing stru c-
tural unemployment related to sex, race,
geography (rural versus urban), and income.
It underwent five major changes from 1974
to 1980 that led to considerable administra-
tion and planning problems. 
Source: Based on Marshall, Briggs, and King 1984; Mangum 1966;  Gottschalk, 1998.
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Table 6 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
Phase 1. Enactment, 1973 C E TA was an amalgamation of the MDTA ,
EOA, and EEA into a single umbrella org a n i z a-
tion and legal stru c t u re. It was viewed as a
move toward a more decentralized employment
p o l i c y. Originally intended to offer transitional
employment, it was initially concerned with
training and work experience and was geare d
t o w a rd unemployed, underemployed, and low-
income workers. By 1977, however, the pro-
gram was primarily being used to create jobs
under the auspices of PSE (see Table 5) and as
a countercyclical macroeconomic policy. 
Phase 2. Reorientation, 1978 C E TA funding was extended for four more
years. A growing desire for tax cuts coupled
with allegations of fraud by certain “prime
sponsors” (cities or counties that received fed-
eral funds under CETA) pushed legislators to
reorient CETA away from broad support for
the unemployed toward support for those who
w e re both unemployed and economically dis-
advantaged. The CETA administration was
centralized and pro c e d u res were made more
complicated, making implementation diff i c u l t
and confusing. Prime sponsors were re q u i re d
to set up private industry councils to act as
a d v i s e r s .
Phase 3. Irrelevance, 1981–1982 The policy orientation beginning in the late
1970s meant that CETA had little to offer as
the economy moved into recession in the early
1980s. Local communities, who had viewed
C E TA as a revenue-sharing arrangement, lost
i n t e rest in the program and consequently its
political appeal diminished. In 1982 the
Reagan administration refused to renew CETA
despite conclusive re s e a rch showing it to have
been beneficial to participants. 
P o s t - C E TA. Job Tr a i n i n g This successor to CETA embodied many C E TA
P a rtnership Act, 1982  f e a tu res, including a focus on the economically
disadvantaged, but diff e red in several impor-
tant ways, most notably in its underlying phi-
losophy that public sector training eff o rt s
should pre p a re workers for private sector jobs.
Thus, the JTPA gave private councils more
power in setting up and running work pro-
grams; state governments were also given more
p o w e r. The act re p resents the beginning of the
end for federal PSE policies.
Source: Based on Marshall, Briggs, and King 1984; Mangum 1966; Gottschalk 1998.
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t r a i ning, adult basic education, English as a second language, counseling,
and a host of other programs designed to produce workers suited to the job
market. The second was the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964,
which sought to make a frontal attack on the roots of poverty thro u g h
employment and training programs for children, teenagers, and older work-
ers in rural areas. The third was the Emergency Employment Act (EEA) of
1971, which provided funds for hiring unemployed workers in public sector
jobs and was designed to cope with the increasing number of unemployed.
Subsumed within the EEA was the Public Service Employment (PSE) pro-
gram, which was also initially seen as a temporary program to fight unem-
ployment but was later reworked into a countercyclical fiscal tool that
could also be used to re d ress certain sex and race imbalances in the
employment ranks.
Over time, CETA changed from a comprehensive, active labor market pro-
gram to a public sector employment program designed to offset private sec-
tor employment fluctuations. In 1978 CETA was reoriented toward helping
only those who were both unemployed and economically disadvantaged.
The 1978 changes also centralized power and added layers of complexity
that reduced local interest in the program. CETA was left to die in 1982
under the Reagan administration, which replaced it with a similar though
m o re private sector–oriented policy program called the Job Tr a i n i n g
P a rtnership Act (JTPA) in 1982. Since the 1980s, the federal govern m e n t ’s
role in labor markets has been minimal. 
The long history of U.S. labor market policies gives us at least a start i n g
point for understanding what does and does not work. Wage subsidies such
as those advocated by Phelps (1997) might induce some private sector
employers to hire workers with low educational attainment and provide on-
the-job training. However, there is the danger that employers will simply
replace existing workers with subsidized workers or that the subsidies will
i n t e rf e re with price signals. Another policy action worth considering is gov-
e rnment provision of (or subsidization of) health care and child care bene-
fits, which would make employment more attractive to those who re m a i n
out of the labor force due to family commitments or to obtain Medicaid.
Such policies may be helpful, but we favor a more comprehensive appro a c h .
Hyman Minsky argued that an infinitely elastic demand for labor at a fixed
wage would guarantee a real job opportunity for anyone who wants to work
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that would “hire off the bottom,” taking all those who are re a d y, willing,
and able to work but who cannot find employers willing to hire them. The
federal government would announce that it would provide the financing to
pay the legislated minimum wage, plus health care and child care benefits,
to anyone re a d y, willing, and able to work. Government agencies at all lev-
els (federal, state, local) and designated not-for- p rofit organizations could
h i re as many new employees as desired, with direct labor costs, including
health and child care benefits, paid by the federal govern m e n t .
Administration and supervision would thus be decentralized, with part i c i-
pating employers setting reasonable perf o rmance standards that would have
to be met by program employees. The federal government would re q u i re
that all these jobs have a significant training component in order to pre p a re
p a rticipants for eventual private sector (or public sector) employment. In
addition, detailed work re c o rds would be kept so that prospective nonpro-
gram employers could re c ruit from among program participants. The goal
would be to create a pool of employable, “buffer stock” labor from which
employers could draw as an alternative to re c ruiting from colleges. 
This program would “hire off the bottom”; it would provide job opport u n i-
ties to all who want to work. It would guarantee full employment, or zero
unemployment, in the sense that anyone could choose to work in the pro-
gram at the minimum wage. Clearly, many would choose to remain unem-
ployed or out of the labor force rather than work at the minimum wage; it is
doubtful that many unemployed college graduates would choose to work in
the program. However, the program is not designed to solve the unemploy-
ment problems of the unemployed highly skilled workers, but is focused on
those who cannot obtain private sector work.6
Past U.S. experience with conceptually similar policies tells us that such a
p rogram would prove effective. Indeed, in an evaluation of public serv i c e
employment policies, Gottschalk concludes that “the U.S. experiments
with PSE indicate that minimum-wage jobs would be demanded if off e re d ”
(1998, 93). One such PSE program was the Youth Incentive Entitlement
Pilot Project (YIEPP), which operated from 1978 and 1981 and off e re d
wage subsidies to private sector employers for providing a part-time mini-
mum wage job or full-time summer job to anyone 16 to 19 years old who
stayed in school. The program proved successful at, among other things,
i m p roving earnings for teens and reducing unemployment diff e re n c e s
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limitations of private sector wage subsidies. Only 18 percent of eligible
employers chose to participate in the program despite a 100 percent wage
subsidy for all workers.
Our “hire off the bottom” policy proposal is much more ambitious than
Y I E P P.  It can achieve a degree of employment that cannot be attained by
expansion alone; the problem with traditional “Keynesian” stimulus pro-
grams is that they might set off inflation long before job opportunities for
those with low educational attainment increase. By hiring off the bottom
and by fixing the wage in the job opportunity program at the minimum
wage, inflation pre s s u res are minimized. Indeed, we believe the buffer stock
of labor will lead to greater price stability than can be achieved under the
c u rrent system, which relies on unemployment to reduce inflation pre s-
s u res. For several reasons, discussed in Wray (1997), workers employed in
the program would constitute a better pool of potential employees than the
c u rrent unemployed population. An obvious reason is that someone work-
ing in the program is demonstrating that she or he is “re a d y, willing, and
able” to work to a degree that most of the unemployed cannot.
As we have shown, most of the jobs created over the Clinton expansion
w e re filled by those with at least some college education. Only a small
number of the new jobs were filled by reducing the ranks of the college-
educated unemployed (the number of college graduates who were unem-
ployed fell by only 287,000 and the number of those with some college who
w e re unemployed fell by about 500,000). Even the Clinton expansion 
was not sufficiently robust to cause employers to reach into the ranks of
those who have not attended college. Thus, in some sense, the true price-
stabilizing pool of re s e rve labor under the current system consists of the
unemployed who have at least some college. Since this pool is far smaller
than what is re q u i red to fill positions created by expansion, most new posi-
tions must be filled by new entrants with some college. In effect, the cur-
rent system relies on a small cushion of perhaps thre e - q u a rters of a million
unemployed with at least some college to help stabilize prices, together
with whatever factors determine the flow of college-educated workers into
the labor force. 
As employers have demonstrated over the past expansion, most new jobs
will not, and perhaps cannot, be filled by re c ruiting from among those
Job Opportunity for the Less Skilled
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ployed or out of the labor force. Policy is re q u i red to increase the experi-
ence and training of the group that does not attend college so that when
private sector demand is high enough, there is an alternative to bidding
up the wages of college-educated workers. The job opportunity pro g r a m
can offer full employment and greater price stability as complements in
contrast to the conventional view of a trade-off between unemployment
and inflation.
C e rt a i n l y, this is only one of many possible active labor market pro g r a m s
that might be used to raise the employment rate of those who do not attend
college. It could be supplemented with an enlarged apprenticeship pro g r a m ,
either as a component of the job opportunity program or as a separate pro-
gram. Additional funding could be provided for vocational training,
t h rough subsidies to private suppliers of such programs or through loans or
other assistance to training program participants. Of course, our analysis
re i n f o rces the conclusion reached by a number of re s e a rchers that young
people should stay in school. Thus, increased funding of “stay in school”
p rograms is appro p r i a t e .
Our analysis has questioned the degree to which labor markets really 
a re tight, at least for the half of the population that has not attended col-
lege. We have also challenged the notion that a rising tide alone can signif-
icantly increase job opportunities for this group. We argue, as the old
Institutionalists did, that it is time to implement a variety of active labor
market policies, with a job opportunity program as its centerpiece. These
policies  can  create  conditions  for  full  employment  and  price 
stability simultaneously.
N o t e s
1. Note that here and below we focus on the 25 and over population (unless other-
wise indicated). This allows us to remove most individuals who would still be in
high school or who might have completed high school and have not yet attended
college, but who might plan to attend college. Thus, if the 25 and over population
of high school dropouts declines, for example, this is primarily due to deaths rather
than to an increase in the number graduating high school or attending college.
2. The category high school dropout includes people of all age groups. Being that a
substantial portion of these are in the over 65 group, we can assume that most of
the population decline can be attributed to deaths.
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in the 25 and over population was unchanged from 1997, the latest year for
which data were readily available for the 25 to 64 population set. This can be jus-
tified because it is unlikely that population figures and the composition of popu-
lation figures changed dramatically over the course of the past seven months.
4. Bell South Telecommunications recently said that it has taken more than 6
months to fill 500 newly created jobs in Florida. Even more surprisingly, it went
t h rough 10,000 applicants before getting the people it wanted (“Jobs Going
Begging” 1998).
5. For example, the workers employed in government make-work programs were
counted as unemployed during the 1930s (Marshall, Briggs, and King 1984, 624).
This clearly reflects the then dominant view that the crisis was only temporary
and only temporary relief eff o rts were needed until “equilibrium” was re s t o re d .
6. We do not have space here to discuss the program in detail; the specifics are ana-
lyzed in Wray (1998 and fort h c o m i n g ) .
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